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Desert Conquests: Early British Planning on the future of the Italian Colonies, June 
1940 – September 1943. 
 
It is surprising that there have not been more academic studies on the question of the Italian 
colonies from 1940 to 1952, which was only answered by an eventual United Nations 
Organisation decision in favour of independence for Libya, a ten year Italian trusteeship of 
Somalia leading to independence, and the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia.1 For, early on, 
this question was recognised by a contemporary commentator as ‘one of the most complex 
and controversial issues in the history of post-war international relations.’ 2 Perhaps this has 
been due to its very complexity or the ‘turgid’ nature of the controversy.3 More mundanely, it 
may be due to the large amount of primary documentation on this subject available in British, 
American and French archives, which can daunt even the most intrepid of researchers. 
Whatever the reason for the few existing studies, the importance of this issue in the 
international history of the Second World War and the early Cold War merits its further 
scrutiny. There is a need, in particular, for a re-examination of early British planning on this 
question during the period of Mussolini’s War, from June 1940 to September 1943, when 
British military, political and diplomatic authorities deliberated on the terms of the armistice 
and eventual peace treaty with Italy and the general future of dependent territories.  
 
British planning on the future of the Italian colonies began following Italy’s declaration of war 
on Great Britain and France on 10 June 1940 and the launching of attacks against British 
positions in North and East Africa.  At this stage of the war the British Commander-in-Chief 
in the Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, considered that the recapture of the 
Sudanese frontier posts of Kassala and Gallabat (occupied by the Italians on 4 July 1940) 
and the fomenting of revolt in Ethiopia, by encouraging the indigenous resistance (‘Patriot) 
movement to Italian rule, offered the best prospect of harassing the Italians with the limited 
forces at his disposal.  But he did not at this stage contemplate a large-scale invasion of 
Italian East Africa4.  He was in fact concentrating all his resources upon his projected 
offensive against the Italian army which had invaded Egypt from Libya in September, halting 
at Sidi Barrani in the Western Desert.  In order to aid British strategy, propaganda and any 
future military administration in these enemy territories and to prevent rash promises being 
made, he requested a definition of British policy by the War Cabinet on the future of the 
Italian colonies. 
 
Wavell found it difficult to conceive of an independent Libya, and he held that Egyptian and 
French claims should be taken into account.  He advised, therefore, against going further 
than the expression of hope by the General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt, 
Henry Maitland Wilson, to Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Sanusi and the exiled Sanusi shaikhs 
in Cairo (following his agreement to participate in the formation of a British-Arab Force – 
later renamed the Libyan Arab Force) ‘that the Arabs may regain their freedom and take 
back their land from the Italian oppressor and restore their independence once more’.5  The 
thrust of British propaganda to Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians would largely depend upon 
whether Great Britain intended to allow the Italians to remain in Eritrea and Somalia, on the 
condition that they evacuated Ethiopia and accepted an armistice.6 
 
The Foreign Office was reluctant to make any definite pronouncements upon the fate of 
these territories since the general situation was so uncertain.  The Southern Department 
stressed that much depended upon the circumstances in which the war ended; whether 
 
 
Great Britain was alone in Europe or whether  the United States was prepared to become 
involved, in which case the need for a friendly Italy would not be so great.  There was a 
tendency to question why Wavell needed a definition of policy on the Italian colonies.  The 
time for this would be after he had occupied these territories and put them under military 
administration.7 
 
The British government was committed to helping the Ethiopians to liberate their country 
from Italy but they had not expressly committed themselves to reinstating Haile Selassie on 
his throne because of continuing uncertainty about whether he would be accepted again as 
Emperor by the Ethiopians, although this seemed increasingly likely.  The Foreign Office 
preferred for the present to avoid a commitment.  Great Britain had declared that it had no 
territorial or other ambitions in Ethiopia but it probably wanted to seek frontier rectifications 
and secure for the Sudan agreement on the use of the waters of Lake Tana.8  Great Britain 
intended to recover British Somaliland (which had been occupied by the Italians in August 
1940) but its ultimate fate remained to be decided.  The British government had made no 
statements about the future of Eritrea and Somalia and, from a political standpoint, it was 
perhaps best to contemplate their remaining in the hands of a reformed postwar Italy, but 
with some measure of demilitarisation and probably some frontier revision for the security of 
Ethiopia, British Somaliland, Kenya and the Sudan.  It was thought that neither territory was 
capable of becoming independent and therefore Great Britain could offer little inducement to 
Eritrean and Somali soldiers to desert.9 
 
As for Libya, where Great Britain was trying to stir up a rebellion among the desert tribes ‘on 
the somewhat vague basis of liberation from Italy’, there were three schools of thought, not 
two as Rossi has identified.10  The first, articulated by the eminent archaeologist Sir Leonard 
Woolley (on secondment to the War Office) and initially supported by the Colonial Secretary, 
Lord Lloyd, was that the British should promise to make it a semi-autonomous province of 
Egypt, as the latter would probably demand if it entered the war.  The second, later 
championed by Lord Lloyd, was that Great Britain should promise Libya to the Libyans, 
although the British were only in contact with the Sanusi shaikhs.  But the head of the 
Egyptian Department in the Foreign Office, Norton, identified a third possibility: that Libya 
should remain Italian.  However, the Foreign Office agreed with the British Ambassador to 
Egypt, Sir Miles Lampson, that it was impossible at present to come out  with any definite 
policy regarding the future of Libya. 
 
The Foreign Office thought that all the British Government  could say with certainty with 
regard to the future of the Italian colonies was; ‘(1) that no reasons of policy preclude us 
from hitting the Italians as hard as possible in all the areas  affected; (2) that eventually 
frontier rectifications will be necessary; and (3) that when non-British territory is occupied by 
our forces a military administration should at once be set up  as was done in Palestine and 
Syria in 1918.’  The Foreign Office recognised that these statements would have very little 
influence upon the attitude of Eritreans, Somalis and Libyans towards the war, but the British 
Government could not assume commitments ‘which we might not be able to fulfil or to make 
any promises which could not perhaps be carried out.’11 
 
The accelerating pace of military events in late 1940, however, forced the British government 
to give further consideration to the future of the Italian colonies.  Following the Italian 
reverses in Greece, at Taranto and in the Western Desert, which precipitated the movement 
 
 
of German troops to the Mediterranean, it seemed vital to bring about as soon as possible 
the surrender of the Italian forces in East Africa in order to clear the Red Sea for the 
passage of Allied and American shipping to Egypt and to enable British forces to be 
transferred to Greece, if they were needed. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, Wavell recommended to the War Cabinet, with the 
backing of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the War Office, that in the event of the 
Italian Viceroy, Aosta, being prepared to accept an armistice in East Africa, Wavell should be 
authorised to grant him generous terms.  Aosta would be asked to evacuate his forces from 
Ethiopia, where Haile Selassie should be restored to his throne, and to agree to their 
assembly and disarmament in Eritrea and Somalia.  In return the British government would 
allow the continuance of Italian administration in these territories for the duration of the war, 
although retaining the right to occupy key positions in Somalia, notably Kismayu, to guard 
against threats (such as internal disturbances) to British lines of communication.  For the 
duration of the war, Great Britain would also occupy British Somaliland, to which it was 
committed, and presumably Jubaland, to satisfy British public opinion.  Moreover, at the 
peace conference the British government would guarantee to support the eventual return of 
Eritrea in full sovereignty to Italy, if the Chiefs of Staff did not object.  Wavell believed the 
country had benefited from Italian rule, and that there was no national feeling among 
Eritreans which would justify independence.  The question of the future of Somalia required 
further consideration as it would be affected by the extensive rectification and demarcation of 
frontiers in the Horn of Africa.  Changes were deemed desirable by the Foreign Office and 
the Colonial Office in order to settle the problem posed for both Italian and British 
administration in the Somalilands by the perennial dispute over tribal grazing and watering 
rights. 
 
Although the War Cabinet readily agreed to the return of Haile Selassie to the throne of 
Ethiopia (announced in Foreign Secretary Eden’s statement of 4th February 1941), it made 
clear that it would only be prepared to consider granting the Italians an armistice in East 
Africa, and permitting the internment of Italian troops in Eritrea and Somalia under British 
military control for the duration of the war, if it would save the British the trouble of a long 
campaign and lead to the early surrender of the Italian forces.  The War Cabinet was not 
prepared however, to give any guarantees about the political future of Eritrea and Somalia.  
The fate of these territories was to be decided at the peace conference.12 
 
In the event the rapid advance made by British forces into Cyrenaica and Italian East Africa 
in early 1941 necessitated urgent decisions by Wavell and the British government on the 
temporary administration of these vast territories.  In order to ensure that administrative 
policy did not conflict with military exigencies, Wavell proposed that military governments 
should be established in the Italian colonies similar to those set up in the Middle East during 
the First World War.  Cyrenaica, Eritrea and Somalia were to be administered on a ‘care and 
maintenance’ basis, according to the Hague Convention of 1907, ‘with the necessary 
modifications on account of colonial conditions’.  Ethiopia would be put under British military 
occupation until it was formally handed over to the Emperor, on terms to be agreed.  Wavell 
intended to delegate the actual organisation and operation of the military administrations to 
his Chief Political Officer, the former colonial governor Sir Philip Mitchell, in accordance with 
the policy that he, Wavell, laid down.  Mitchell would appoint Deputy Chief Political Officers 




There was such ‘community of thought’ on this matter between Cairo, London and Pretoria, 
that the British and South African governments duly acquiesced in Wavell’s proposed 
arrangements.  The South African government was consulted not only because of its major 
military contribution to the East African campaign but because of its political and strategic 
interest in Italian East Africa.  The War Cabinet decided that the War Office should be the 
department with overall responsibility for the administration of the occupied territories.  As 
the Lord Privy Seal, the leader of the Labour Party, Clement Attlee, explained to the War 
Cabinet, ‘the Foreign Office is not suitably organised to direct an administration, and if the 
Colonial Office were put in charge of any of the enemy territories, we should be suspected of 
seeking to incorporate them in our Empire’.  The latter object was far from the minds of 
Ministers in 1941.  But the establishment of British military government in the Italian colonies 
brought with it political problems.13 
 
Cyrenaica was the first of the Italian colonies to be occupied.  The main problem facing the 
new Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyrenaica, General Wilson, and his Deputy Chief 
Political Officer, Brigadier Longrigg, who set up his headquarters in Benghazi, the capital, on 
18th February, was that of reconciling the indigenous population of some 200,000 Arabic-
speaking Muslims, to the continued presence of those Italians (some 20,000) who had 
remained behind in Benghazi and the agricultural settlements in the highlands, rather than 
flee to Tripolitania.  In order to avert reprisals and violence it was necessary to reverse 
British propaganda, which since Italy’s entry into the war had incited the native population 
against their Italian rulers. 
 
Fortunately Cyrenaica remained generally peaceful during the first British occupation, and 
the native population was on the whole well-behaved and reasonable towards the Italians.  
Longrigg was unsure, however, how long the goodwill of Cyrenaican Arabs would last once it 
became clear that the British supported the continued Italian occupancy of the best 
agricultural land, and would punish anyone who tried to dispute it.  He predicted that further 
problems were likely if or when the British Military Administration proclaimed that it was a 
temporary regime which was more interested in economic order than in setting up an Arab 
Amirate.  The head of Egyptian Department in the Foreign Office, Bateman, thought that 
Great Britain might be creating a ‘second Palestine’ in Cyrenaica.14 
 
In considering the political future of Cyrenaica, the British authorities in Benghazi, Cairo and 
London, had to take into account the desire of the indigenous population to free themselves 
from Italian rule.  There were doubts, however, about whether the Sanusi tribesmen, who 
constituted the overwhelming majority of the population in Cyrenaica, and their exiled leader 
Sayyid Idris, were capable of ruling themselves.  Moreover, Sanusi aspirations to the 
overlordship of Libya were disputed by the Tripolitanian leaders-in-exile.  Yet the alternative 
solutions were not free from objections. 
 
There were practical and political difficulties to a suggestion by Churchill for the 
establishment of a Free Italian Colony in Cyrenaica, although the Foreign Office admitted 
that it would be very valuable from the propaganda point of view, as it would enable Great 
Britain to encourage the Italians to hope that the future of Italy, and the retention of its 
colonies, was not inextricably intertwined with the fate of Fascism and Germany, and thereby 
create, in Churchill’s words ‘a real split in Italy’.  The loyal Italian Fascist settlers in Cyrenaica 
 
 
were regarded in Cairo as unlikely recruits to a strong Free Italian Movement, which in any 
case lacked leadership.  There proved to be insurmountable difficulties to raising a Free 
Italian Force from the 100,000 Italian soldiers captured in the Western Desert, and it was 
regarded as too dangerous to experiment with a Free Italian Movement in Cyrenaica or 
Egypt as long as there was a threat of an enemy counter-attack from Tripolitania.  Moreover, 
Wavell and Lampson thought there would be unfavourable reactions from the Sanusis, 
Egypt and the Arab world to a Free Italian Cyrenaica. 
 
There appeared to be stronger arguments for trying out the scheme in Eritrea, which was 
adjudged to be more secure and could offer a safe haven to the Italian fleet in the event of 
Italy’s collapse, but Eden was against making an announcement to this effect before Italian 
resistance in East Africa had ended.  He feared that it might lead Haile Selassie and the 
Ethiopian tribesmen fighting the Italians to believe that the British were thinking of striking a 
bargain with Italy over Ethiopia, which would ‘cool patriotic enthusiasm’.  Richard Lamb has 
stated that ‘Eden did not oppose Churchill’s wild project’ and that the Foreign Office 
supported it, when in fact, as has been shown, both Eden and the Foreign Office, in 
cooperation with Lampson and Wavell, effectively opposed it.15 
 
The Egyptians were regarded by some officials in London, such as Bateman and Woolley, 
as the most likely future suzerains of Cyrenaica, which they perceived in terms of the 
defence of Egypt.  Whilst Bateman simply advocated that Great Britain should commit itself 
during the war to recognising the Egyptian claim to ‘the lot of sand and drop of water called 
Jaghbub’ (the strategically-located oasis on Egypt’s western border, which Egypt had been 
forced to cede to Italy in 1925 when Great Britain was ‘pursuing the mirage of Mussolini’s 
goodwill’), Woolley went further and recommended that the British government immediately 
issue a declaration that Cyrenaica should become an autonomous province of Egypt after 
the war.  According to Bateman and Woolley, such concessions would not only help ‘keep 
Egypt “sweet”’ during the war, but would also enmesh the Egyptians in administrative 
problems in Cyrenaica, thus diverting their attention for a time from the question of Egypt’s 
renewed participation in the administration of the Sudan.  Egypt could also grant Great 
Britain the defence facilities it would require in Cyrenaica to guard Egypt’s ‘Desert Flank’.  
Furthermore, they argued that such ‘disinterested’ acts would appeal to Arab nationalism, 
would deliver a grave blow to the prestige of Fascist Italy, and would reassure Vichy France 
that Great Britain had no annexationist designs upon French North Africa. 
 
There were serious drawbacks, however, to these schemes.  The Foreign Office agreed with 
Lampson and Wavell that the British government could not afford to get involved at this 
stage of the war in a wrangle with the Egyptians over frontier rectifications.  Also, Lampson 
and Wavell doubted whether the Sanusis would be likely to accept the cession of Jaghbub to 
Egypt or nominal Egyptian rule in Cyrenaica especially if, as expected, it was exercised in a 
heavy-handed way, and feared alienating the Sanusis.  Lampson did not want to encourage 
Egypt to play a greater role in Arab politics, to the detriment of Great Britain’s position in the 
Middle East.  Lampson and Wavell were opposed to Egyptian aggrandisement in Cyrenaica, 
not in favour of it, as Lamb has alleged.16 
 
The only realistic alternatives to Egyptian rule of Cyrenaica were British or international 
control.  The latter solution did not have any serious proponents at this stage of the war.  
Both Sayyid Idris and Sir Miles Lampson indicated, in different fashion, that they were 
 
 
interested in the idea of a British presence in Cyrenaica after the war.  The declaration of a 
British protectorate over Cyrenaica would have certain advantages.  It would enable the 
establishment and protection of some form of native state, thus meeting Sanusi aspirations.  
This would be welcomed by Arab opinion.  At the same time, it would allow Great Britain the 
strategic advantage of denying Cyrenaica to an enemy power, thus giving security to Egypt 
and protection from the west to the British position in the Middle East.  Lampson, Wavell and 
the Foreign Office were against the British government making any commitments on the 
future of Cyrenaica, or Libya as a whole, to the Sanusis, the Egyptians or the Italians, for, 
quite apart from anything else, the war was not over and it was impossible to predict what 
was going to happen.  This was the situation when in April 1941 the Axis forces, under 
General Erwin Rommel, made their successful counter-offensive to the Egyptian frontier, 
and the first British military administration of Cyrenaica came to an end.17 
 
The loss of Cyrenaica was followed almost immediately by the British occupation of Italian 
East Africa.  The Chief Political Officer for Occupied Enemy Territories Administration, 
Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell, attempted, with the backing of the War Office, to turn 
Ethiopia into a virtual protectorate of Great Britain, as part of his grandiose scheme for a 
much-enlarged East African dependency.  But this was rejected by the War Cabinet, at the 
urging of Haile Selassie, Eden and the Foreign Office, on the grounds of cost and political 
expediency.  After Ethiopian independence had been re-established (by the Anglo-Ethiopian 
Agreement and Military Convention of the 31st January 1942, which terminated the 
temporary British military occupation), Great Britain was left with responsibility for the 
peripheral territories.  British military administrations were set up in Eritrea18, Somalia, British 
Somaliland and a series of ‘Reserved Areas’ and cantonments.  These consisted of the vital 
Franco-Ethiopian railway from Addis Ababa to the French Somaliland border, a belt of 
Ethiopian territory, twenty-five miles wide, adjacent to French Somaliland which was needed 
to blockade Vichy-controlled Djibouti19, and the Somali-inhabited areas of eastern Ethiopia, 
the Haud and the Ogaden.  The Haud was ruled by a British Senior Civil Affairs Officer from 
the Ethiopian administrative centre of Jigjiga, whilst the Ogaden remained attached to 
Somalia and was administered with that territory from the British Military Administration’s 
headquarters at Mogadishu.20 
 
The ‘Reserved Areas’ were retained without prejudice to Ethiopian sovereignty, under the 
1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention, primarily for military reasons, in 
order to counter any danger from French Somaliland and to prevent any disruption to British 
lines of communication which might arise from the expected resistance of the heavily-armed 
Somali tribes to the re-imposition of Ethiopian rule.  It was felt that the latter eventually might 
also have serious political repercussions upon Great Britain’s position in the Middle East, 
since the Arabs had shown that they were concerned with the fate of their co-religionists 
under Amhara rule.  But there were also political reasons for the retention of these areas.  
Whilst Mitchell, who negotiated the agreement with Ethiopia, wanted to include the Ogaden 
in a Greater Somalia under British control, the Colonial Office sought frontier rectifications 
which would safeguard the water and grazing rights of the British Somali tribes in the Haud.  
The Emperor objected to these reservations, especially that of the Haud and the Ogaden, 
which he feared might be permanent, and sought ways to circumvent them pending the 
negotiation of a new agreement or treaty with Great Britain.  It was generally held in London 
and Nairobi (where Political Branch headquarters had been relocated following the loss of 
Cyrenaica), however, that the Haud and the Ogaden would have to be retained under British 
 
 
military administration until the peace settlement.  Consequently, Haile Selassie had failed to 
secure a British commitment to return these territories to Ethiopian rule upon the expiry of 
the 1942 Agreement and Military Convention in 1944.21 
 
In Eritrea and Somalia, the British military administrations were confronted with a host of 
administrative, economic and political problems.  A low-key approach in Eritrea22 was 
successful in persuading most Italians to acquiesce in the British Administration’s authority 
and made it possible in November 1941 to arrest and intern 3,000 Fascist ‘troublemakers’.  
By the end of the year the real danger of the outbreak of widespread disorder and of Eritrea 
becoming a major military commitment to British Middle East Command had passed.  The 
development of Allied military projects in Eritrea from the winder of 1941 (which involved 
some 3,000 American military and civilian personnel and led to the opening of a U.S. 
consulate in Asmara) provided work for the 14,000 unemployed and, by creating a home 
market with a high buying power, stimulated the growth of light industry.  This was just as 
well, for, with the end of the war in Africa in 1943, most of the war projects were closed down 
and many of the skilled Italians and some of the unskilled Eritreans were absorbed by local 
industry.  In order to ease the supply burden the Administration reduced the Italian 
population by shipping 20,000 POWs to India, Kenya and South Africa in 1941, and 10,000 
civilians were repatriated to Italy in 1942-43.23 
 
The British occupation of Eritrea had a revolutionary effect upon the Coptic Christian 
Abyssinians inhabiting the Central Plateau (they comprised the overwhelming majority, 79 
per cent or 351,000 of the population).  The liberal British administrative methods (e.g. 
removing the official colour bar, setting up of Native Courts and Advisory Councils, 
appointing a few Eritreans to minor government posts and establishing native health and 
educational services) and the anti-Italian propaganda disseminated by the British both 
before and during the 1941 campaign, encouraged the Christian Abyssinians to think for 
themselves for the first time.  This coincided with the growing economic distress of both 
townsmen and peasantry due to the effects of inflation, unemployment, pressure on the land 
and onerous taxation.  Christian Abyssinian aspirations combined with economic distress to 
breed discontent, which sought an outlet in racial hatred against the Italians, Muslim Arabs, 
Abyssinian Muslims (Jiberti) and Sudanese, who all seemed to prosper at the expense of 
Christian Abyssinians.  The latter began to suspect the British Administration of favouring 
their enemies.  In this bitter climate it was not surprising that the most discontented elements 
of the Christian Abyssinian population should be susceptible to the pro-Ethiopian 
propaganda of their Coptic priests, led by the Bishop of Tigrai and Eritrea, the Abuna 
Marqos, who had spiritual, political and material reasons for advocating the union of Eritrea 
with Ethiopia.24 
 
The Emperor Haile Selassie periodically reiterated Ethiopia’s claim to Eritrea and requested 
in April 1942, that Great Britain give an assurance that Eritrea would not be returned to Italy, 
or to any other foreign power (much along the lines of Eden’s pledge to the Sanusis in 
Cyrenaica on 8th January 1942).  Apart from the racial, linguistic, religious, economic, and 
historical reasons which were given for the incorporation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, it was 
regarded as just compensation for Ethiopia’s recent suffering.  Haile Selassie, and his 
supporters in Great Britain (such as Sylvia Pankhurst) also maintained that the British 
Government had given ‘solemn pledges’ both before and during the 1941 campaign (in 
 
 
propaganda leaflets dropped by the R.A.F.) to the people of Eritrea and the Benadir 
(Somalia) that they would be ‘reunited’ with their ‘motherland’, Ethiopia, after the war. 
 
It was felt in London that the British government could not be committed by a proclamation 
from the Emperor, and if the text of the British leaflet was inopportune and somewhat 
equivocal, it implied no more than an imprudent promise that Eritreans would have a say in 
their future.  The Foreign Office refused to discuss the question of Ethiopian territorial claims 
to Eritrea and Somalia, arguing that this was a matter for the peace settlement.  This did not 
discourage Haile Selassie from pursuing his aims.  In 1942, at Ethiopian instigation, the 
Society for the Love of the Land of Eritrea was set up in Eritrea, and by 1944 (as the 
Unionist Party), it was calling for the union of that territory with Ethiopia to exploit the 
Christian townsman’s grievances.  The Unionist movement soon won over the Christian 
Abyssinians of Asmara and other towns on the plateau to the Ethiopian cause.  It was to 
take longer to win converts among the peasantry, who were under the influence of their 
politically cautious chiefs.  It was the emergence in 1943 of the anti-Ethiopian and pro-British 
organisation, the Separatist Movement, which polarised politics on the plateau.  In contrast 
the Muslim population of Eritrea (numbering some 520,000), who had fared tolerably well 
under the British regime, remained politically apathetic.  They were geographically isolated, 
lacked educated leaders, and were too preoccupied with their own tribal affairs, to take an 
interest in the colony’s politics.25 
 
In Somalia and the adjacent Ogaden, inhabited by over 1,000,000 warlike Somali nomads, 
Italian administration had completely broken down as a result of the military campaign.  The 
hastily created Somalia Gendarmerie had succeeded by 1943 in the general disarmament of 
the population and had neutralised the threat posed by the pro-Italian irregular (banda) 
groups.  The British Administration succeeded in making Somalia self-sufficient in primary 
foodstuffs by 1943, although serious shortages were later to occur.  As in Eritrea, the lack of 
sufficient British personnel forced the British Administration to retain the services of Italian 
officials, especially technical staff, in order to maintain a central government.  It was not until 
1942 that senior Fascist officials were interned to prevent their becoming a fifth column in 
the event of Japanese naval operations off the East African coast.  In addition, the 
Administration sought to alleviate the distress of Italian civilians, many of whom were 
dependent upon public assistance, by repatriating about one-third of the population (2,300 
women and children) to Italy in 1943.26 
 
In contrast to the Italian government, the British Administration followed a progressive policy 
towards the Somalis.  It encouraged native education through the founding of schools, made 
the efficient Italian medical service available to all, and trained a small number of Somali 
officials and senior police officers, thus providing the basis of a Somali civil service.  The 
Administration promoted local government in preparation for eventual autonomy and self-
government, by recognising tribal jurisdiction and custom, and the authority of Muslim 
(Sharia) courts, and encouraged tribal assemblies to work with British political officers in the 
provinces and districts of Somalia.  Most significant of all, the lifting of restrictions in 1943 on 
political activity led to the establishment of a number of Somali societies and clubs.  The 
most important of these was the Somali Youth Club, which espoused a modern and 
progressive Somali nationalism, had considerable Somali support and was viewed with 
sympathy by the British Administration.  The bringing of all the Somali peoples of the Horn of 
Africa under British administration provided an ideal opportunity for the realisation of Somali 
 
 
nationalist aspirations.  The British occupation of Somalia, the Ogaden and the Haud and the 
recovery of British Somaliland (where the authorities were also pursuing progressive 
policies) had also made it possible to resolve inter-territorial disputes more easily.  In 
particular, the British Administration in Somalia allowed the British Somaliland authorities to 
administer their tribes when they crossed into the Haud and the Ogaden in the rainy season 
in search of pasturage for their herds, so averting conflict with the Ogaden tribes.  The 
benefits of making such an arrangement permanent were plain for all to see.27 
 
The decision to restore Ethiopian independence and the British occupation of Eritrea and 
Somalia led the Foreign Office, in conjunction with the Colonial Office and their respective 
representatives in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, to try to delineate the main elements of British 
policy on the future of these territories in anticipation of the peace settlement after the war.  
There was general opposition to the return of Italy to Eritrea and Somalia since it was felt 
that it would continue to pose a threat to Ethiopia’s independence, which Great Britain 
desired to see fully restored.  There was no real desire to see Great Britain acquire these 
colonies because this would be contrary to declarations by the British government, 
particularly the Atlantic Charter, and they would be an economic burden.  On the other hand, 
ethnical confusion prevented their becoming independent states.  Consequently there was 
general support for the redrawing of colonial boundaries along more rational ethnic, 
economic and strategic lines in order to benefit the inhabitants of the region. 
 
It was felt that Eritrea should be partitioned, with the northern part being ceded to the Sudan, 
thus uniting the Bani Amr tribes, and southern Eritrea being incorporated within Ethiopia, so 
uniting the Danakil tribes and allowing Ethiopia an outlet to the sea at Assab, (an alternative 
proposal, for the re-establishment of sultanates among the Danakil tribes, if they objected to 
Ethiopian rule, was not thought to be practicable given the Sultan of Aussa’s close 
association with Ethiopia).  In return for this, and also perhaps the cession of Eritrean Tigrai 
to Ethiopia, to enable the re-creation of the old kingdom of Tigrai (an idea advanced by the 
Foreign Office), the Governor of Kenya, Sir Henry Moore, suggested the possibility of the 
Ethiopian government agreeing to the cession of Ethiopian Somaliland (i.e. the Ogaden) to a 
united Somalia under the supervision of either an international body or a ‘disinterested 
power’, such as the United States or Sweden, which was favoured by the Colonial Office.28 
 
The Foreign Office thought that the British government would be ‘on very treacherous 
ground’ if it advocated the creation of a ‘Greater Somalia’, given Emperor Haile Selassie’s 
likely opposition to the cession of the Ogaden, Great Britain’s repeated pledges that it had 
no designs on Ethiopian territory and the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory 
ethnographical frontier.  The Foreign Office preferred the setting up of self-governing 
sultanates or shaikhdoms in the Somalilands, much along the lines of the Eastern and 
Western Aden Protectorates, in order to avoid the danger of their becoming an onerous 
colonial burden.  The Colonial Office, and particularly the former governor of British 
Somaliland, Sir Vincent Glenday, pointed out the administrative and economic 
impracticability of re-creating shaikhdoms in the Somalilands, to which they were opposed.  
They emphasised that until the international frontiers of the Somalilands, which cut through 
the water and grazing rights of the nomadic tribes, had been rectified in order to give the 
Somalis more security, and until a sense of collective responsibility had been developed 
among the Somalis through a Council or Committee along the lines of a Soviet, then self-




This exchange of views on ‘the thorny problem’ of the future of the Somalilands, and the 
warning from the British Minister to Ethiopia, Robert Howe, that it would be unwise to raise 
this question with the Emperor at that time when many other considerations, such as 
irredentism in Eritrea, were involved, convinced the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office 
that the time was not yet ripe for discussion as to what the general lines of the British 
government’s policy should be on frontier rectifications and the Greater Somalia proposal.  
They realised, however, that they would have to have some concrete proposals ready for 
consideration by the time the war ended, and negotiations for the peace settlement began.29 
 
The events in Ethiopia and the Levant in 1941, namely the British government’s recognition 
of Emperor Haile Selassie as the ruler of an independent Ethiopia and Anglo-Free French 
pledges on the independence of Syria and Lebanon, spurred Sayyid Idris, at the suggestion 
of his followers (particularly ‘Umar Shinnib, who had taken an active part in nationalist 
activities in Syria in the 1930s) to demand similar treatment for Libya.  Sayyid Idris refused to 
agree to the request of the British military authorities in Egypt to transfer two battalions of the 
Libyan Arab Force to Syria for occupation duties, unless he was accorded recognition as an 
ally of Great Britain and given assurances as to the future of his people.  Sayyid Idris 
requested a promise from the British government that the Sanusis would be freed 
permanently from Italian rule and that an Arab amirate would be established in Libya, or at 
the very least Cyrenaica, under British protection or a mandate on the model of Transjordan, 
after the war.  By the end of the year, and after the success of the Eighth Army’s ‘Crusader’ 
offensive and the second British occupation of Cyrenaica, Sayyid Idris was under such 
pressure from his Sanusi followers, encouraged by the Tripolitanian leaders, to secure such 
a pledge from the British government that he even threatened to withdraw from active 
collaboration with Great Britain unless he received it.30 
 
The newly-appointed Minister of State in the Middle East, Oliver Lyttelton, impressed upon 
the Foreign Office the need for an early public declaration by the British government which 
would meet Sayyid Idris’s demands, at least as far as Cyrenaica was concerned.  Lyttelton 
argued that the Sanusis had suffered severely for supporting the British and had received 
nothing in return.  They could not very well be returned to Italian rule and it was, therefore, 
reasonable to consider granting them some form of autonomy.  This would make a 
favourable impression upon the Arabs and Muslims in general, and it could be represented 
as following on from Eden’s Mansion House speech about Syrian independence and Arab 
unity.  It would also solve the immediate problem concerning the use of the Libyan Arab 
Force.  Above all, it would be in Great Britain’s short and long-term strategic interests for 
Cyrenaica to be in friendly hands after the war, thereby acting as a natural fortified bulwark, 
with British bases, for the protection of Egypt. 
 
It is known that the Foreign Office was prepared to see Great Britain guarantee that the 
Sanusis in Cyrenaica would never again come under Italian rule, and felt that this ‘would 
have a good effect on the Arab world generally’, and that it convinced Lyttelton and the War 
Cabinet that it would be premature to announce the establishment of an Arab amirate in 
Cyrenaica under British protection along the lines of Transjordan after the war.  But the 
reasoning behind this decision needs to be made clear.  Apart from a general reluctance to 
assume commitments during the war, the Foreign Office was convinced that the setting up of 
a Sanusi state, in any form, would be a grave setback to Italy, and more unacceptable than 
 
 
Egypt or Great Britain annexing Cyrenaica.  Furthermore, the British government had yet to 
decide whether it was prepared to recognise Sanusi nationality, to shoulder the financial 
burden of supporting a Sanusi amirate, and to transfer their troops from Egypt to Cyrenaica 
after the war.  Some officials in the Foreign Office (Bateman) and the War Office (Woolley) 
favoured handing over Cyrenaica to Egypt at the peace settlement.  The Egyptian 
government had already put forward a claim to frontier rectifications with Cyrenaica.  There 
were doubts about whether the territory could become independent because of its mixed 
Italian and Arab population.  The suggestion was made that Cyrenaica might be offered to 
Egypt after the war as ‘lebensraum’ for its expanding population in exchange for the 
Egyptian government agreeing to relinquish Egypt’s share of the Sudan Condominium to 
Great Britain.  This was regarded as the most likely solution in London at this time and it is 
incorrect, therefore, for Rossi to argue that it was being displaced by the idea of an 
autonomous Sanusi amirate under British protection.31 
 
Consequently, after giving advanced notice to Sayyid Idris, and gaining the approval of the 
United States and Dominion governments, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, 
made only a limited declaration in the House of Commons on 8th January, 1942, that ‘His 
Majesty’s Government is determined that at the end of the war the Sanusis in Cyrenaica will 
in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination’.  It should be pointed out that in 
order to prevent Axis propaganda exploiting the rather negative language in which the British 
declaration was couched, British Information Officers in the Middle East, in publicising the 
declaration, referred to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and hinted that some form of 
autonomy for the Sanusis in Cyrenaica would be a natural development after the war.  But, 
at Foreign Office insistence, this was not published or conveyed in written form to Sayyid 
Idris and his followers since, although it promised the liberation of Cyrenaica, it contained no 
positive assurance as to the future of the territory.  It was sharply criticised by the exiled 
Tripolitanian leaders as it failed to promise that Tripolitania would also be freed from Italian 
rule and seemed, by its reference to the Sanusis, to imply prior British recognition of Sanusi 
leadership in Libya.  After Lyttelton’s rejection of an outright demand by Sayyid Idris in 
February 1942 for a written guarantee from the British government of Libyan independence, 
the exiled Sanusi shaikhs realised that they had little choice but to accept the British 
government’s verbal promises on the future freedom of Cyrenaica.32 
 
The British found themselves having to honour their promise to the Sanusis in a manner that 
they had not seriously anticipated.  After only a month of occupation, Rommel’s counter-
offensive forced the British Eighth Army to withdraw east of the Jabal Akhdar at the end of 
January 1942.  Many Sanusi tribesmen from the Jabal, fearing Italian reprisals, fled to 
Eastern Cyrenaica, which remained under British Military Administration, while others sought 
refuge in Egypt.  Before the British could implement plans for evacuating the whole Arab 
population (who had now, ironically, become a security risk), from the area of operations, in 
May Rommel resumed the offensive which enabled him to capture Tobruk and to advance to 
within sixty miles of Alexandria.  The road seemed clear for the Axis capture of Egypt and 
Mussolini flew from Rome to Cyrenaica in anticipation of his triumphal entry as ‘Protector of 
Islam’ into Cairo.  Those Sanusis who could escape from Cyrenaica did so, and were 
evacuated with other Libyan civilians to the Sudan and Palestine, but many were left behind 
to face the wrath of the Italians.  The pro-Allied Libyan leaders, including Sayyid Idris, were 
persuaded to go to Jerusalem after King Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi leaders refused, on 




It was not until November 1942, after the Eighth Army’s victory at al-Alamain and the third 
and final British occupation of Cyrenaica, that Great Britain was finally able to redeem its 
pledges that the Sanusis would never again be subjected to Italian domination.  In June 
1942 Eden had made clear to the British authorities in Cairo that this entailed the end of 
Italian rule in Cyrenaica, ‘though no explicit statement to that effect has been made or will be 
made for the present’ (it is wrong, therefore, for Rossi to suggest that this was the one 
certainty emanating from the January declaration).34  This policy was duly carried out by the 
Military Government in the winter of 1942/43,35  It was made easier by the Italian 
government’s prior withdrawal of its remaining nationals from the territory.  The War Office 
and the Foreign Office stressed that Sayyid Idris was not to be installed as head of a native 
state in Cyrenaica during the war as Great Britain would be accused of prejudicing the peace 
settlement.  Apart from the requirements of international law there were strong doubts about 
the administrative capability of Sayyid Idris.  The decision to maintain Cyrenaica ‘as a purely 
Arab country like Transjordan’ until the end of the war at least allowed the Sanusis to re-
establish their life without fear of Italian retribution.  The British administrators encouraged 
the Sanusis to farm the arable land of the Jabal Akhdar on a communal basis.  They also 
started to develop rural and municipal government along native lines in Cyrenaica with the 
co-operation of Sayyid Idris, who agreed to use his influence with the Cyrenaican Arabs on 
behalf of the Military Government (Sayyid Idris remained in Cairo until his position had been 
more clearly defined by a decision on his country’s future; he paid a brief and successful visit 
to Cyrenaica in July 1944).  It was a natural progression from this policy for the Foreign 
Office in London and the British authorities in Cairo to consider some form of Egyptian 
protection (as part of a barter deal over the Sudan) for an autonomous Sanusis amirate in 
Cyrenaica after the war, which would meet both the local economic and political needs of a 
new native state and at the same time satisfy British strategic requirements.36 
 
Tripolitania was terra incognita for Great Britain as the Eighth Army never advanced beyond 
the Sirte Desert until late December 1942.  Little attention had been devoted to the problem 
of military administration, let alone to the question of the future of Tripolitania.  It was agreed 
that Tripolitania should fall under British, rather than American, military jurisdiction in order to 
preserve internal security and economic stability in Libya.37  The divided state of Tripolitanian 
politics, combined with the presence of a large Italian minority, discouraged the British from 
making any commitments on the future of the territory.  In contrast to Cyrenaica it was 
decided to maintain the Italian administrative structure in Tripolitania intact.  The country was 
to be administered in accordance with a strict interpretation of international law on the 
occupation of enemy territories, on a ‘care and maintenance basis’.38  This meant that the 
British administrators maintained a strict impartiality between the often competing interests 
of the native majority and the Italian minority.39  Tripolitanian Arab, Jew and Italian alike were 
represented on the advisory bodies set up by the British military administration.  It was not 
until the late summer of 1943 that Tripolitanian-Arab politicians began to demand that all 
Italian officials, especially judges, be removed from the B.M.A., that Italian lands, which 
continued to be farmed by Italian colonists, be returned to the Arabs and that Arab schools 
be established to educate the Tripolitanians in order that they might govern themselves.  
When in 1944 many of the Arabs who had formerly resisted the Italians returned from exile, 
full independence was demanded by a newly-formed Nationalist Party which was allowed 





Sayyid Idris and the leading Tripolitanian exiles in Cairo had more ambitious plans.  They 
desired nothing less than the creation of an independent amirate in Libya, with Idris as Amir.  
The Tripolitanians remained opposed to the Sanusis but they hoped, by renewing the idea of 
a Sanusi amirate, to secure the support of Sayyid Idris in their campaign to extract the same 
concessions for Tripolitania as the British had made in Cyrenaica.  For his part, Sayyid Idris 
was quite content to draw any political benefits he could from the Tripolitanian initiative but 
was less anxious to help his rivals escape from their predicament.  The British military 
administrators in Libya and the Chief Political Officer and the Minister of State in Cairo were 
too absorbed by their task of establishing law and order and reviving the devastated 
economies of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania to give more than passing attention to the political 
demands of Sayyid Idris or the exiled Tripolitanian leaders.  They were simply told that the 
future of Libya could only be decided at the peace settlement and until then Italian North 
Africa would remain under British military administration in accordance with international law.  
The same curt reply was given by Churchill to King Farouk when the latter, following the 
British capture of Tripoli in January 1943, tentatively advanced Egypt’s claim to Libya.41  
 
The situation in Tripolitania was complicated by the occupation in January 1943 by Free 
French forces, commanded by General Leclerc and operating from Chad, of the Fezzan 
oases of southern Tripolitania and a strip of territory twenty miles wide, including the oases 
of Ghadames, Derg and Sinauen bordering on south-eastern Tunisia, and the proclamation 
of French military government.  General de Gaulle had territorial designs on southern Libya 
which was ‘le lieu geographique entre le Sud-Tunisien et le Tchad’.  The Fezzan was 
intended to be Free France’s share of the ‘fruits’ of the Allied victory in North Africa.  This 
objective clearly ran counter to the plans of the British military administrators for British 
control throughout Tripolitania and Saharan Libya, in order to frame a clear-cut 
administrative policy which would be, as far as possible, in the best interests of the Arab 
inhabitants.  They hoped also to allay Arab fears that western Libya was to be partitioned 
with the French being allowed to add the Fezzan to their Central African territories. 
 
Developments in French North Africa following the ‘Torch’ landings were to dictate the British 
response.  Eden and the Foreign Office were anxious to build up de Gaulle’s political 
position vis-à-vis General Giraud in order to encourage the formation of a united front for the 
liberation of France.  The Foreign Office succeeded in persuading the War Office that if the 
British government pressed de Gaulle to make concessions over the administration of the 
Fezzan it would only create ‘bad blood’ between the British and the Free French and 
undermine de Gaulle’s growing prestige.  The British military and political authorities in Cairo 
were forced to concede that considerations of haute politique must take precedence over 
local administrative concerns.42 
 
It soon became plain that the French intended to isolate the Fezzan and the oases on the 
south-eastern border of Tunisia from the rest of Libya.  These territories were integrated 
administratively and financially with southern Algeria, with the local garrison commanders, 
who also acted as the political and administrative officers, governing in collaboration with the 
local prominent family, the Saif-al-Nassir (whose head Ahmad Bey had led the Fezzanese 
resistance to the Italian occupation before being forced into exile in Chad in 1931; he 
returned with ‘la colonne Leclerc’ in 1943 and was installed as mutasarrif in Murzuk, the old 
trading capital of the Fezzan by the Free French).  The military administration also pursued a 
 
 
progressive economic and social policy, accompanied by repression of political activities, in 
an attempt to persuade the 30,000 Fezzanese of the benefits of continued French rule.  In 
order to facilitate rapid land and air communications between French North and Central 
Africa, a military road (Track no.5) was built linking Gabes in Tunisia to Lake Chad via 
Sebha, and airfields established at Ghadames, Ghat, Sebha and Brak.  The French initiated 
these developments in the hope of permanently retaining the Fezzan within French North 
Africa under the terms of the future peace treaty.43 
 
The varying nature of the military administrations was to influence British thinking on the 
future of Libya.  This developed rapidly following the fall of Italy’s last colony in Africa, the 
signs of an impending collapse in Italy and the first serious peace-feelers put out by 
disgruntled Italian military and political figures. The formulation of Great Britain’s ‘desiderata’ 
with regard to the future of the Italian colonies was intended to avoid prejudicing British 
interests in any future armistice.  By early May 1943, as the Allied armies finally overcame 
the Axis resistance in Tunisia, it was clear from the inter-departmental discussion in 
Whitehall that opinion was generally in favour of Italy losing its colonies.  It was not until 
August, however, that a relatively junior official in the Foreign Office, Viscount Hood of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department, was able to draw up ‘preliminary conclusions’ on 
the future of these territories, as a result of further discussions between London, Cairo and 
Nairobi.44 
 
Hood thought that Somalia, along with French Somaliland, British Somaliland and the 
Ogaden should be formed into a Greater Somalia which, as it would not be ready for 
independence, should probably be under international trusteeship, preferably with British 
administration.  It was felt that Eritrea should be given to Ethiopia in return for the surrender 
of the Ogaden, which would be incorporated in Greater Somalia, and subject to the cession 
of the Bani Amr tribes of North-Western Eritrea to the Sudan and the establishment of base 
facilities for the use of the United Nations in the Massawa-Asmara area, either under 
international trusteeship or Ethiopian sovereignty, but administered by Great Britain.  But the 
most influential official in the Foreign Office on Ethiopia at this time, Gilbert Mackereth, of the 
Egyptian Department, denied that they had reached an preliminary conclusion to this effect.  
He said there had been little thought on this and regarded it as far more important to secure 
the agreement of Ethiopia to the adjustment of its frontiers with Kenya and the Sudan than to 
create a Greater Somalia, including the Ogaden.45 
 
As for Libya, Hood proposed a separate fate for Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, which was 
already implicit in the decision to maintain separate military administrations in these two 
territories.  Cyrenaica might be placed under Egyptian sovereignty or trusteeship, or made 
into an international trusteeship, subject to the safeguarding of Great Britain’s undertakings 
to the Sanusis and the establishment of extensive military, naval and air facilities for the sue 
of the United Nations.  The advantage of Egyptian sovereignty was that it might provide a 
useful card in extracting facilities for Great Britain’s defence requirements in Egypt.  But the 
Foreign Office hoped that the defence of the Suez Canal could be arranged without 
stationing troops in the Nile Delta and instead depending on a ring of satellite bases around 
Egypt, including Cyrenaica, Eritrea and Somalia, in which the Strategic Reserve might be 
located.  It was not thought that the Soviet Union, which was assumed by the Foreign Office 
to be a cooperative and friendly power in the summer of 1943 (although not by the Strategic 
Planners of the Joint Planning Staff who, in December 1942, had pointed to a possible air 
 
 
threat in the Red Sea should the Soviets establish themselves in the Persian Gulf) would 
object, as it would no doubt realise that the Red Sea was a vital sea route for the British 
Empire.  In fact it was at this time that the Soviet government first indicated that if favoured 
depriving Italy of its colonies and that they expected to be consulted on their future.46 
 
None of the various possibilities for Tripolitania (incorporation in the British Empire, cession 
to the Bey of Tunis or France, or return to Italy under certain conditions) were deemed free 
from objections.  The most likely solution seemed to be to place it under international 
trusteeship, with Great Britain or Malta, France, the United States, Greece, Turkey, or even 
Italy, as possible administrators.  But the main obstacle to Foreign Office plans remained the 
Colonial Office, which wanted ‘to end not extend the mandate system.’  It was in order to 
outflank the Colonial Office that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Nigel 
Ronald, was instructed to do some ‘discreet snooping’ during his visit to Washington to 
ascertain unofficially American views on the future of the Italian colonies, and especially on 
international trusteeship, which would enable the Foreign Office to work out detailed 
proposals for submission to the War Cabinet.47 
 
British planning was also affected by American anti-colonialist pressure.  The British 
government recognised the need to diffuse American criticism of British imperialism, since 
cooperation with the United States was deemed to be both necessary and desirable for the 
survival of the British Empire.  But there was a division of opinion in Whitehall as to how far 
Britain should go towards the American concept of international trusteeship.48  The refusal of 
the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office, backed by Churchill, to entertain the idea of 
independence for colonies and dislike of the vague American proposal of international 
trusteeship meant that Eden and the Foreign Office gave a cool response to Hull’s advances 
on this subject in Washington in April and Quebec in August 1943.  As a counter to this the 
British government, at the instigation of the Colonial Office, evolved the idea of international 
cooperation on economic and defence matters through regional commissions but with the 
‘parent’ or ‘trustee’ States retaining control of the development of their colonies in order that 
they might eventually achieve self-government.49 
 
British planning was complicated by various proposals for using these captured territories as 
temporary or permanent refuges for displaced or persecuted minorities, such as the Greeks, 
the Assyrians of Iraq and the Jews.  The Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Agency and 
the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Middle East (CCAO, ME) in Cairo, Major-General Hone, 
rejected as unworkable proposals for admitting Greek refugees from Cyprus to Cyrenaica 
and settling Assyrians in Cyrenaica or Eritrea, although the latter suggestion was briefly 
reconsidered later in the war.50 
 
It is possible to exaggerate the importance of the fact that the Ministerial Committee on 
Palestine accepted the view of Arnold Toynbee and the Foreign Office Research 
Department that Jewish settlement in Libya and Eritrea was ‘a definite possibility though one 
fraught with economic and political hazards’ and approved it in principle.  The political 
departments of the Foreign Office, supported by the Colonial Office and the Deputy Minister 
of State in the Middle East, Lord Moyne, had already succeeded in scuppering these plans 
by casting doubts upon their economic and political feasibility.  The Jewish settlement 
project died long before the Palestine partition scheme came to nought in 1944.  Ironically, 
the Foreign Office had been prepared to consider temporary Jewish settlement in Libya 
 
 
during the war but was opposed by the War Office and the C.C.A.O.,  M.E. in Cairo on 
security grounds.  In the event, illegal Jewish immigrants and convicted terrorists were sent 
from Palestine to Eritrea, but not to settle.  They were interned.51 
 
The Allies said nothing in the armistice with Italy about the fate of its colonies in order not to 
hold out any hope that it would recover them and at the same time not to alienate Italian 
opinion.  The Italian intermediary, General Zanussi, later claimed that the British Minister 
Resident in the Mediterranean, Harold Macmillan, and the American representative in North 
Africa, Robert Murphy, had told him that in their personal opinion they thought Libya, Eritrea 
and Somalia would be returned to Italy, with some slight rectification of the Egyptian frontier, 
but there is no evidence to corroborate this statement.52 
 
The omission of any reference in the armistice to the future of the Italian colonies, coupled 
with Churchill’s casual remark in the House of Commons on 21 September that ‘the Italian 
Empire has been lost – irretrievably lost’53, was regarded as an ominous sign by prominent 
Italian exiles, who on their return to Italy, began to agitate for the restoration of Italy’s older 
colonies (Eritrea, Somalia and Libya).  Although they received no succour from the British 
and the Americans, these Italian spokesmen derived some comfort from the fact that the 
leader of the Free French, General de Gaulle, had intimated to Count Sforza that he would 
support Italy’s claim to remain ‘an African power’.  He made it clear, however, that whilst he 
favoured Italy retaining Tripolitania, Eritrea and Somalia, the Italians would have to accept 
the loss of Cyrenaica to Great Britain, of Fezzan to France, and be prepared to make 
concessions to Ethiopia in Eritrea.54 
 
Rossi has said that the solutions put forward by the British government on the future of the 
Italian colonies after the war were based on the plans conceived between 1941 and 1943 
and that they were symbolised by the idea of a ‘Greater Somalia’.55  It has been shown, 
however, that British planning commenced not in 1941 but in 1940, and that if anything 
symbolised British planning in their period it was the limited declaration in January 1942 that 
‘His Majesty’s Government is determined that at the end of the war the Sanusis in Cyrenaica 
will in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination’, which, as Eden made clear in 
June 1942, entailed the end of Italian rule in Cyrenaica.  The idea of a ‘Greater Somalia’ was 
still too nebulous a concept at this stage to be considered a definite British plan, let alone a 
commitment.  But the start of British planning on the future of the Italian colonies should be 
seen as part of the process of preserving the paramount influence of Great Britain in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and dealing with the threat posed by Italy and its 
colonies to the British position in the region.56 It should also be noted that, for reasons of 
imperial strategy, the Foreign Office sought cooperation in the summer of 1943 on the future 
of the Italian colonies with the State Department. But the extent to which the State 
Department would take the British position into account in formulating its policy on the Italian 
colonies would depend not only on developments in the occupied territories but in 
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